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The Knock-and-Announce Rule:




Woven into the western world's legal fabric by English courts over four
centuries ago,2 the knock-and-announce rule requires law enforcement offi-
cials to knock at a residence and announce their presence prior to executing a
search warrant.3 Recently, the efficacy of this law enforcement restriction and
essential civil right has been challenged by various United States courts. On
June 15, 2006, the United States Supreme Court eviscerated an essential rem-
edy for violation of this rule,4 and last year, the Eighth Circuit's decision in
Doran v. Eckold diminished the threshold for permissible no-knock entries.5
These decisions have eroded the constitutional protection the Supreme Court
previously established.
This protection is provided by the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution, which defends "[t]he right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures." 6 To this end, the Supreme Court incorporated the common law
knock-and-announce rule into its Fourth Amendment analysis of what consti-
tutes "unreasonable searches" of residences.7 The court acknowledged that
exigent circumstances, such as disposal of evidence or danger to law en-
forcement officials, may eliminate this requirement of officers to knock-and-
announce their presence. 8 However, the Court neglected to offer guidance for
determining the existence of these circumstances.
9
1. 409 F.3d 958 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
2. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995) (citing Semayne's Case,
(1603) 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B.).
3. Id.
4. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S.Ct. 2159 (2006). In Hudson, the Supreme Court
held that the exclusionary rule was not a proper remedy for violation of the knock-
and-announce rule. Id. at 2170. The exclusionary rule prohibits the admission of evi-
dence unlawfully obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 2163.
5. Doran, 409 F.3d 958.
6. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
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The Eighth Circuit has conducted this exigent circumstances analysis on
numerous occasions.t0 Without specific guidance, the Eighth Circuit has fol-
lowed the Supreme Court's general framework for conducting this analysis: a
case-by-case examination of the "totality of the circumstances."" In Doran v.
Eckold, however, the Eighth Circuit's exigent circumstances analysis resem-
bled a generalized, not particularized, evaluation of the facts. This Note ar-
gues that this manner of generalized evaluation, prohibited by the Supreme
Court in Richards v. Wisconsin, creates an unacceptable standard for police
conduct.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In July 1998, the Kansas City Police Department ("KCPD") received an
anonymous tip describing illegal drug-related activity at the home of David
Doran ("Doran"). 12 The tip alleged that Doran was manufacturing metham-
phetamine and selling it, along with crack cocaine, from his house. 3 Further,
the tip alleged that Doran kept guns in his bedroom and that Doran's son,
who also lived in the house, had previously been arrested for possession of a
sawed-off shotgun. 14
The KCPD sent a narcotics detective to investigate the tip.'5 The detec-
tive verified that both the residence and the cars parked in front belonged to
the Doran family.' 6 The detective also collected trash bags from the front of
the residence' 7 which contained items relevant to the KCPD's investigation:
two plastic bags with methamphetamine residue, fifty plastic baggies cut in a
way consistent with the distribution of narcotics, an empty "Dristan" bottle,'
8
and mail addressed to the Dorans. 19 With this evidence and the anonymous
tip, the detective acquired a search warrant for the Doran residence.
20
10. See United States v. Walsh, 299 F.3d 729 (8th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Lucht, 18 F.3d 541 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Marts, 986 F.2d 1216 (8th Cir.
1993).
11. Doran v. Eckold, 409 F.3d 958, 962-63 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (citing
Richards v. Wisconson, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997); United States v. Banks, 540 U.S.
31, 40 (2003).




16. Id. The occupants of the residence were David Doran, his wife Linda, his son
Joseph, and Shirley Smith. Appellee's Brief at 11, Doran v. Eckold, 409 F.3d 958 (8th
Cir. 2005) (No. 03-1810).
17. Doran, 409 F.3d at 960.
18. Dristan is a product often used to manufacture methamphetamine. Id.
19. Id. at 960-61.
20. Id. at 961. The search warrant obtained did not authorize a no-knock entry.
[Vol. 71
2
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 3 [2006], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol71/iss3/6
KNOCK-AND-ANNOUNCE
At 10:00 p.m. on August 11, 1998, KCPD's Street Narcotics Unit exe-
cuted the search warrant at the Doran residence. 2 1 Sergeant Eric Greenwell
("Greenwell"), the officer in charge of executing the search, instructed the
unit to use a dynamic entry, also known as a "no-knock entry." 22 Greenwell's
instruction was based on his briefing with the investigating detective and an
independent review of the search warrant.23 To effectuate the no-knock entry,
Officer Ty Grant, announced, "Police, search warrant," and then immediately
struck the front door of the Doran's residence with a ram.24 On the third hit,
the door opened and Officer Mark Sumpter entered the residence.25 Upon
reaching the kitchen, Sumpter encountered Doran holding a gun.26 Sumpter
yelled, "Police, search warrant, get down," and shot Doran twice after Doran
allegedly failed to lower his weapon. 27 The officers then searched the resi-
dence, but did not discover any evidence of a methamphetamine lab or other
drug distribution paraphernalia.
28
Doran filed multiple 42 U.S.C § 1983 claims against the officers in-
volved and the Board of Police Commissioners for violation of his Fourth
Amendment rights.29 The district court granted the officers' motion for sum-
mary judgment on Doran's claim of illegal search,30 but denied summary
judgment on the excessive force claim and the illegal entry claim.3' At trial,
the jury concluded that Sumpter's use of force was justified, but awarded
Doran over $2 million on the illegal entry claim.32 The decision regarding the
illegal entry claim hinged upon the trial judge's ruling that, as a matter of law,
a no-knock entry was not justified because exigent circumstances did not
21. Id. at 960.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 968 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 960.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. According to Doran's testimony, he was asleep when the no-knock entry
began. Id. He thought the commotion was an intruder, grabbed his gun and went to
investigate. Id. Doran soon realized it was the police, but the officer shot him as he
bent down to drop his gun. Id.
28. Id. at 961. The only drug found at the residence was an ounce of marijuana in
Doran's son's bedroom. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. The court held the investigating officer had sufficient probable cause for
the search warrant. Id. After the grant of summary judgment on the illegal search
claim, Doran dropped his claim against the investigating officer for unlawful execu-
tion of the warrant, and the investigating officer was eliminated as a defendant. Id.
31. Id. The excessive force claim was against Sumpter, and the illegal entry
claim was against Greenwell, Grant and the board of police commissioners. Id.
32. Doran v. Eckold, 362 F.3d 1047, 1049 (8th Cir. 2004).
2006]
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exist.33 On appeal, a three-judge Eighth Circuit panel affirmed the trial
court's decision.
34
On rehearing en banc, the Eighth Circuit reevaluated whether exigent
circumstances justified the officers' use of a no-knock entry.35 The officers
argued that the investigation of the narcotics detective, specifically the evi-
dence found in Doran's trash, was sufficient to justify the entry.36 Conversely,
Doran argued that such evidence was insufficient to justify the use of a no-
knock entry because none of the circumstances which had previously justified
a no-knock entry were present.37 The majority reversed the rulings of the trial
court and Eighth Circuit panel.38 By so ruling, the Eighth Circuit held that an
anonymous, unsubstantiated tip alleging methamphetamine production and
the presence of violent inhabitants, as well as physical traces of metham-




A. The "Knock-and-Announce" Principle at Common Law
The knock-and-announce rule stems from a common law principle "pro-
tect[ing] a man's house as 'his castle of defense and asylum."4 0 Adhering to
this principle, the English common law courts allowed the state to forcibly
enter a dwelling if it was the only plausible option.4' Prior to making such an
entry, the common law required the state to notify the inhabitant of its pur-
pose.42 This requirement, which forms the basis for the knock-and-announce
rule, was first introduced in a 1604 English court decision, Semayne's Case.43
33. Id. at 1049-50.
34. Id. at 1054. The appellant's raised four issues on appeal: (1) the reasonable-
ness of force used during the search eliminates the proximate cause on the illegal
entry claim, (2) the exigent circumstances to allow a no-knock entry did exist as a
matter of law, (3) the testimony of an expert witness was improperly admitted and (4)
the court abused its discretion in denying a mistrial for improper questioning of a
witness. Id. at 1050-54.
35. Doran, 409 F.3d at 958.
36. See Appellants' Brief at 24-29, Doran v. Eckold, 409 F.3d 958 (8th Cir.
2005) (No. 03-1810).
37. See Appellee's Brief at 22-27, Doran v. Eckold, 409 F.3d 958 (8th Cir. 2005)
(No. 03-1810).
38. Doran, 409 F.3d at 967.
39. Id.
40. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995) (quoting WILLIAM BLACK-
STONE, 3 COMMENTARIES, *288).
41. Id. (citing Semayne's Case, (1603) 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B.)).
42. Id. (quoting Semayne's Case, (1603) 77 Eng. Rep. at 195.
43. Id. (quoting Semayne's Case, (1603) 77 Eng. Rep. at 195.
[Vol. 71
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In Semayne's Case, the court stated that "the sheriff... may break the
party's house, either to arrest him, or to do other execution of the K[ing]'s
process, if otherwise he cannot enter. But before he breaks it, he ought to
signify the cause of his coming, and to make request to open the door."44 This
principle, which continued in the English legal system,a5 and was adopted by
early American courts and incorporated into the laws of the states.
46
B. United States 'Adoption of the "Knock-and-Announce" Rule
In the United States, the knock-and-announce rule was adopted by both
Congress and the judiciary. In 1822, the first American court introduced the
knock-and-announce rule in Read v. Case.47 Since Read, courts have contin-
ued to incorporate this principle into the American legal fabric and estab-
lished exceptions to it.48 Furthermore, in 1917, Congress enacted what is now
18 U.S.C. § 3109, 49 which essentially codified the knock-and-announce
rule.50 Section 3109 states:
The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a
house, or any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute a
search warrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is
refused admittance or when necessary to liberate himself or a per-
son aiding him in the execution of the warrant.
51
The Supreme Court first addressed this principle in Miller v. United
States.5 2 Though the decision in Miller was based on local law, not the Fourth
Amendment or Section 3 109,53 this was the Supreme Court's first attempt at
determining the knock-and-announce rule's applicability to the state's entry
into a private residence. 54 After conducting a lengthy analysis of the common
law principles of notice and announcement, the court ruled that the entry was
44. Id. (quoting Semayne's Case, (1603) 77 Eng. Rep. at 195.
45. Id. (quoting Case of Richard Curtis, (1757) 168 Eng. Rep. 67, 68 (Crown)
("[N]o precise form of words is required in a case of this kind. It is sufficient that the
party hath notice, that the officer cometh not as a mere trespasser, but claiming to act
under proper authority.")).
46. Id. at 933.
47. See Read v. Case, 4 Conn. 166 (1822).
48. See State v. Pelletier, 552 A.2d 805 (Conn. 1989); Crabtree v. State, 479
N.E.2d 70 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985); Dunfee v. State, 346 A.2d 173 (Del. 1975).
49. Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, Title XI, §§ 8-9, 40 Stat. 229 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (2000)).
50. See Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 587-89 (1968).
51. 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (2000).
52. 357 U.S. 301 (1958).
53. Id. at 305-06.
54. See id. at 306-314.
2006]
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unlawful because the officers broke in "without first giving [the owner of the
residence] notice of their authority and purpose."55
In subsequent Supreme Court cases, the court continued to address the
knock-and-announce rule in relation to statutory law, rather than a require-
ment of the Fourth Amendment's "unreasonable searches" analysis.5 6 The
Court's determination hinged on the constitutionality of the various statutes
under the Fourth Amendment.57 It was not until 1963 that the Court directly
evaluated the knock-and-announce rule as a requirement of the Fourth
Amendment.
58
The Supreme Court first incorporated the knock-and-announce rule into
the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness analysis of law enforcement
searches and seizures in Wilson v. Arkansas.59 The defendant in Wilson filed a
motion to suppress evidence because the officers "violated the common-law
principle requiring them to announce their presence and authority before en-
tering." 6 Reversing the Arkansas Supreme Court, the Supreme Court held
that law enforcement officers must knock and announce prior to entry, but
countervailing law enforcement interests may allow a no-knock entry.61 The
Court, however, declined to list situations in which such countervailing fac-
tors may exist.62 Although the Wilson Court expressed a desire to leave the
determination of these countervailing factors to lower courts, three subse-
quent Supreme Court decisions have provided insight into such determina-
tions.
In Richards v. Wisconsin, the Supreme Court rejected a blanket excep-
tion of the knock-and-announce rule for felony drug investigations. 63 In Rich-
ards, the defendant was suspected of dealing cocaine from a motel room.
64
The officers had substantial evidence of narcotics distribution and requested a
search warrant authorizing a no-knock entry.65 The Magistrate granted the
warrant without the provision allowing for no-knock entry.66 The Wisconsin
Supreme Court held it reasonable to assume that exigent circumstances ex-
isted because "all felony drug crimes will involve 'an extremely high risk of
serious if not deadly injury to the police as well as the potential for the dis-
55. Id. at 313.
56. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 482-84 (1963); Ker v. Cali-
fornia, 374 U.S. 23, 40-41 (1963); Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 591.
57. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 482-84; Ker, 374 U.S. at 40-41; Sabbath, 391
U.S. at 591.
58. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 927.
61. Id. at 936.
62. Id.
63. 520 U.S. 385, 396 (1997).
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posal of drugs by the occupants prior to entry by the police." 67 The Supreme
Court disagreed with this assumption and held that, under the particular cir-
cumstances encountered, law enforcement officers must have a "reasonable
suspicion" that announcement of their presence would be dangerous, futile or
inhibitive upon the effective investigation of the crime. 61 The Court held that
the burden of establishing "reasonable suspicion" was not high, but the offi-
cers should have to carry this burden each time the use of the entry is ques-
tioned.6 9
The Supreme Court next addressed no-knock entries in United States v.
Ramirez.70 In Ramirez, the officers received a reliable tip that the defendant, a
dangerous escaped felon, was in possession of firearms and at the home of a
friend.71 The officers obtained a search warrant allowing a no-knock entry.72
While executing the warrant, the officers broke the window of the suspected
house.73 The tip provided information that weapons and guns were stashed in
the garage.74 The officers broke a window to the garage and pointed a gun
inside to prevent the suspects from retrieving the contraband.75 The Court
found that police officers are not held to a higher standard when a no-knock
entry results in property damage.76 Police must still demonstrate a reasonable
suspicion to justify a no-knock entry, and the damaging of property is not a
factor in that determination. 77 However, the Court noted that excessive dam-
age to property, even during the execution of a lawful no-knock entry, could
violate the Fourth Amendment. 78 Ultimately, the Court applied the same rea-
sonableness standard to determine whether the damaging of property was
justified under the circumstances encountered.79
Finally, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Banks that forced
entry by police officers was justified when the officers paused fifteen to
twenty seconds after announcing their presence.80 The Court reasoned that the
67. Id. at 390 (quoting State v. Richards, 549 N.W.2d 218, 219 (Wis. 1996)).
68. Id. at 394.
69. Id. at 394-395.








78. Id. at 65-66.
79. Id. at 66.
80. 540 U.S. 31, 33 (2003). The law enforcement officers received information
that the defendant was selling cocaine from his apartment. Id. The officers in front of
the apartment announced their presence loud enough to be heard by the officers at the
rear of the building. Id. With no indication of anyone inside, the officers waited 15 to
20 seconds before using a battering ran to enter the residence. Id.
2006]
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potential for disposal of evidence was sufficient to warrant a forcible entry in
this circumstance.8' The Court, however, again emphasized the importance of
considering the "totality of the circumstances" when making such a determi-
nation.82 The use of categorical schemes could incorrectly pigeonhole and
impede the fact-finding process necessary to make an accurate determination
of reasonableness.8 3 In this instance, the Court held that the potential disposal
of cocaine was sufficient to warrant a forcible entry.
s4
As these cases show, the knock-and-announce rule is firmly embedded
within the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.8 5 Exigent
circumstances may provide an exception to the rule, but the Court still applies
a "totality of the circumstances" test to determine when the exception ap-
plies.8 6 The Court, however, has provided only guidelines for making such a
determination and has instead left the task to the lower courts.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. The Majority
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, reversed the dis-
trict court and Eighth Circuit panel decisions in Doran.87 The majority held
that exigent circumstances justified the defendants' use of a no-knock entry,
and thus, the defendants' search was constitutionally reasonable. 88 The major-
ity's analysis of the case first dismissed four "faulty legal premises" relied
upon in the district court's exigent circumstances ruling.89 The majority then
discussed the facts upon which it based its holding.90 Lastly, the majority
discussed the reasonableness of defendant'Greenwell's decision to use a no-
knock entry when executing the search warrant.91 Upon conducting its analy-
sis, the majority concluded that the defendants' no-knock entry was reason-
81. Id.
82. Id. at 42.
83. Id. at 42.
84. Id. at 31.
85. Craig Hemmens & Chris Mathias, United States v. Banks: The "Knock-and-
Announce" Rule Returns to the Supreme Court, 41 IDAHO L. REv. 1, 36 (2004); see
also Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995); Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385
(1997); United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65 (1998); United States v. Banks, 540
U.S. 31 (2003).
86. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995); Richards, 520 U.S. 385; Ra-
mirez, 523 U.S. 65; Banks, 540 U.S. 31.
87. Doran v. Eckold, 409 F.3d 958, 967 (8th Cir. 2005).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 963-64.
90. Id. at 965-66.
91. Id. at 967-68.
[Vol. 71
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able and that the claims should not have been submitted to the jury.92 As a
result, the majority reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded
the case with instructions to dismiss the complaint.
93
1. Dismissal of "Faulty Legal Premises"
Reviewing the exigent circumstances ruling de novo, the majority's
analysis began by refuting the district court's analysis of four legal prem-
ises.94 First, the majority stated that the district court over-emphasized the
defendants' failure to obtain a search warrant authorizing a no-knock entry.
95
In making this assertion, the majority relied upon the decision of the Supreme
Court in Dalia v. United States, which held that the manner of executing the
search warrant is at the discretion of the executing officers.97 The majority
bolstered this principle by citing Richards v. Wisconsin,98 a Supreme Court
decision upholding the legalfi of a no-knock entry after the request for a no-
knock warrant was denied. For the majority, the relevant question was
"whether the officers have reasonable suspicion of exigent circumstances at
the time they execute the warrant," not at the time the officers requested the
warrant.1'° Thus, the type of warrant the officers actually possessed was ir-
relevant so long as exigent circumstances existed at the time of execution.
Second, the majority disagreed with the district court's analysis regard-
ing the similarity of the facts known to the officers when requesting and exe-
cuting the warrant.t1t The majority stated that executing officers may con-
sider the totality of the circumstances when executing the warrant, including
those facts known prior to application for the warrant.'0 2 To hold otherwise,
the majority argued, would require the officers to request no-knock authority
whenever the execution of the warrant may require such an entry.' 03 The ma-
jority claimed that such a requirement would encourage excessive use of no-
knock entries.'°4 Therefore, the majority held that facts known prior to ob-
taining the warrant could sufficiently support the exigent circumstances re-
quirement.1
05
92. Id. at 967.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 964.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 257 (1979).
98. Doran, 409 F.3d at 964.
99. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997).
100. Doran, 409 F.3d at 964.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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Third, the majority stated that the district court incorrectly applied the
inadequacies of the investigation conducted by the field officers to the Street
Narcotics Unit officers executing the search warrant. 1°6 The majority noted
that section 1983 liability is personal, and therefore, the court must only con-
sider whether the conduct of the executing officers, Grant and Greenwell, was
constitutionally reasonable. 0 7 In making this determination, the court consid-
ered the "settled principle that law enforcement officers may rely on informa-
tion provided by others in the law enforcement community, so long as the
reliance is reasonable."'
0 8
The majority's final disagreement with the district court involved the
manner in which Officer Grant routinely operated the ram during no-knock
entries: announcing the officers' presence and simultaneously breaking in
with the ram without knocking or waiting for a response. 0 9 The majority held
that Grant, briefed and assigned as ram officer by Greenwell, could rely upon
the judgment of his superior officer."10 Therefore, according to the court,
Grant's conduct as the ram officer was irrelevant to the reasonableness of the
no-knock entry." 1
2. Error in the District Court's Factual Analysis
In addition to the legal questions, the majority disagreed with the district
court's evaluation of the facts as applied to its exigent circumstances analy-
sis. 11 2 The majority found that the lower court over-emphasized portions of
the pretrial record, while quickly dismissing others.' 13 Primarily, the majority
disagreed with what the district court held was "an incomplete investigation
to verify the anonymous tip."" 4
The majority focused on the drug residue, sandwich bags with the cor-
ners cut out and mail addressed to the Doran residence." 5 The court placed
considerable weight on this evidence even though the testimony did not con-
firm that the drug paraphernalia and the Doran's mail were found in the same
trash bag. 116 The majority also disagreed with the district court's assertion
that the trash did not contain any evidence suggesting the Dorans were manu-
106. Id. at 965.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 964-65.





115. Id. The cut off corners of sandwich bags are often used containers to distrib-
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facturing methamphetamine. 1 7 The court pointed to the existence of an
empty box of Dristan as such evidence.1 18 By dismissing such evidence, the
majority found the fact-finding underlying the district court's exigent circum-
stances ruling clearly erroneous.
119
3. Justification of Exigent Circumstances
Finally, the majority considered whether exigent circumstances justified
Greenwell's decision to execute the search warrant for the Doran residence
with a no-knock entry.120 The court considered the facts known to Greenwell
at the time of execution and cited a series of cases finding exigent circum-
stances in similar situations. 121 Ultimately, the majority held that the facts
known to Greenwell were sufficient to justify the no-knock entry.' 22
First, the majority found that Greenwell's level of research was reason-
able for an officer in charge of executing a search warrant.' 23 The court found
it persuasive that the anonymous tip indicated that the Doran residence alleg-
edly contained a methamphetamine lab.' 24 Recounting portions of Green-
well's testimony, the court emphasized the dangers of executing a search
warrant on a home harboring a methamphetamine lab. 125 The majority noted
that this has justified no-knock entries in the past and cited a series of cases in
support.126 Next, the majority stated that, during his investigation, Greenwell
learned of both ongoing drugs sales from the residence and guns that were
kept in the house. 127 In considering this information, the court again listed
past decisions justifying no-knock entries under similar circumstances.1 28
Lastly, the court stated that Greenwell had learned that Doran's son had al-
legedly been arrested for possession of an illegal weapon. 129 The majority
117. Id.
118. Id. at 965-66. Dristan contains pseudoephedrine, a methamphetanine precur-
sor. Id.
119. Id. at 966.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 966-67.
123. Id. at 966. Greenwell reviewed the warrant and warrant affidavit, interviewed
the investigating officer and drove by the Doran residence. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. (citing United States v. Tucker, 313 F.3d 1259, 1265-66 (10th Cir. 2002);
United States v. Keene, 915 F.2d 1164, 1168-69 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Spinelli, 848 F.2d 26, 29-30 (2d Cir. 1988)).
127. Id.
128. Id. (citing United States v. Washington, 340 F.3d 222, 227 (5th Cir. 2003);
United States v. Garnbrell, 178 F.3d 927, 928-29 (7th Cir. 1999); State v. Baker, 103
S.W.3d 711, 717-19 (Mo. 2003) (en banc)).
129. Id. at 966-67.
20061
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acknowledged the inaccuracy of the illegal weapon possession, but again
offered court decisions under which such information justified no-knock en-
tries. 13
0
Considering the totality of the circumstances, the court held that the in-
formation available to Greenwell established "a reasonable suspicion of exi-
gent circumstances."' 3 1 According to the majority, the existence of such cir-
cumstances permits law enforcement officers to conduct a no-knock entry
without violating the Fourth Amendment' 32 As a result, the court held that
Greenwell's decision to use a no-knock entry and Grant's execution of the
no-knock entry were constitutionally reasonable. 33 Without a violation of
Doran's constitutional rights, the claims against the Board of Police Commis-
sioners should not have been submitted to the jury.' 34 Accordingly, the major-




Circuit Judge Heaney disagreed with the majority's decision that exigent
circumstances justified the no-knock entry at the Doran residence. 13 6 His dis-
sent argued that the officers did not adequately prove exigent circumstances
to overcome the Fourth Amendment's right to privacy in one's home. 137 In
support of this assertion, the dissent began by reviewing the investigation and
facts upon which the officers acted.138 The dissent next examined prior court
decisions relevant to this issue; including the decisions relied upon by the
majority, the seminal Supreme Court decisions and the decision the dissent
considered most apposite. 39 After conducting this analysis, the dissent con-
cluded that exigent circumstances did not exist and, therefore, the district
court's ruling should be affirmed.
40
130. Id. (citing United States v. Nguyen, 250 F.3d 643, 645 (8th Cir. 2001);
United States v. Gay, 240 F.3d 1222, 1228-29 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Weeks, 160 F.3d 1210, 1213-14 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Murphy, 69 F.3d
237, 243 (8th Cir. 1995)).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 962-63.
133. Id.





138. Id. at 968-69.
139. Id. at 969-73.
140. Id. at 974.
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1. Criticism of the Police Investigation
The dissent began by criticizing the limited investigation conducted by
the police officers.14' The dissent first noted that the investigation was based
upon an anonymous tip from an informant with questionable reliability.' 42 In
addition, the dissent argued that the information conveyed by the tip could
have easily been verified, but the officers failed to do so.143 The dissent ac-
knowledged the traces of methamphetamine found in the trash may point to
use or even sale of the drug, but did not support the conclusion that a
methamphetamine lab was in operation. 144 The opinion offered a list of
Eighth Circuit cases which described the type of evidence often associated
with operating labs. 145 The dissent stated that none of the typical signs from
those cases were observed by any officer during the investigation of the
Doran residence. 146 Therefore, Judge Heaney argued that the officers relied
on uncorroborated evidence, a reliance he considered "unreasonable, and





The dissent also disagreed with the majority's opinion that Greenwell
and Grant were not liable because they relied on information provided by the
investigator. 148 Judge Heaney argued that, since Greenwell and Grant knew
most of the information was uncorroborated, liability was not removed. 149
Thus, for the dissent, the majority's argument on this point was irrelevant in
evaluating the existence of exigent circumstances.
150
The dissent next argued that, since the information known to the officers
was the same when they requested and executed the search warrant, a no-
141. Id. at 968.
142. Id. As previously stated, this tip alleged methamphetamine was made and
sold from the Doran residence and Doran's son had recently been arrested for pos-
sessing an illegal firearm. Id.
143. Id. A series of examples is listed, including a failure to check the Doran's
criminal history, a failure to check the son's arrest record or verify he lived at the
address, a failure to conduct surveillance of the Doran residence, a failure to conduct
a controlled buy at the Doran residence, and a failure to observe any signs of a
methamphetamine lab. Id.
144. Id. at 969.
145. Id. (citing United States v. Lloyd, 396 F.3d 948, 954 (8th Cir. 2005); United
States v. Dishman, 377 F.3d 809, 810 (8th Cir. 2004); Klienholz v. United States, 339




148. Id. at 970.
149. Id. at 970-71 (citing United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 232-33 (1985)
(holding that the reasonableness of police conduct depends upon the extent of the
officers' knowledge).
150. Id. at 971.
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knock entry was not allowed. 15 1 Judge Heaney asserted that law enforcement
officers should not be allowed to conduct a no-knock entry when they did not
request one and additional circumstances did not arise to warrant one. 52 The
dissent cited United States v. Scroggins, a prior Eighth Circuit decision, stat-
ing that "it seems more consistent with the Fourth Amendment to ask a neu-
tral judge for approval before intruding upon a citizen's privacy."' 53 Addi-
tionally, "the showing the police must make to obtain a no-knock warrant is
the same showing they must make to justify their own decision to disrense
with the knock-and-announce requirement. Only the timing differs."" The
dissent noted that, as a result of the majority decision, even timing did not
matter. 155 Ultimately, the dissent argued that the executing officers should not
be able to usurp the role of the neutral judge by failing to request a no-knock
warrant and then by using the tactic, even though the facts remained un-
changed.'
56
2. Dismissing the Cases Cited by the Majority
The dissent dismissed the majority's cases which held that the operation
of a methamphetamine lab had justified a no-knock entry in prior cases.
57
The dissent noted that the four cases relied upon by the majority all contained
reliable evidence of the current operation of a methamphetamine lab.'
58
Unlike the reliable evidence available in the cases cited by the majority,
Judge Heaney argued that the evidence in this case, drug paraphernalia and a
box of Dristan, failed to provide the reasonable suspicion required to justify a
no-knock entry.
159
151. Id. at 973-74.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 974 (quoting United States v. Scroggins, 361 F.3d 1075, 1082 (8th Cir.
2004)).
154. Id. (quoting Scroggins, 361 F.3d at 1082).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 973-74.
157. Id. at 969.
158. Id. at 969-70 (citing United States v. Tucker, 313 F.3d 1259, 1265-66 (10th
Cir. 2002) (permitting a no-knock entry after direct observation of purchases of
methamphetamine precursors); United States v. Spinelli, 848 F.2d 26, 29-30 (2d Cir.
1988) (permitting a no-knock entry because defendant had a prior conviction for
methamphetamine production and agents observed activity consistent with the manu-
facturing of methamphetamine); United States v. Walsh, 299 F.3d 729, 734 (8th Cir.
2002) (permitting a no-knock entry after agents smelled ether and found equipment
consistent with methamphetamine production); United States v. Keene, 915 F.2d
1164, 1166-67 (8th Cir. 1990) (permitting a no-knock entry after direct observation
on an operating methamphetamine lab)).
159. Id. at 970.
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The dissent next examined the basic knock-and-announce principle un-
der the Fourth Amendment. 16° The dissent noted that Wilson v. Arkansas,
which initially included the knock-and-announce principle within the Fourth
Amendment's reasonableness inquiry, allowed unannounced entries if a
threat of violence or a possibility for the destruction of evidence could be
shown.161 Judge Heaney argued that the government failed to make a showing
of either in this case.
162
The dissent continued its analysis of the knock-and-announce principle
by discussing the Supreme Court's decision in Richards v. Wisconsin.163 In
Richards, the Supreme Court struck down a blanket exception to the knock-
and-announce principle for felony drug investigations. 164 After noting the
Court's emphasis on the importance of evaluating the facts and circumstances
of each specific no-knock entry, 165 the dissent contended that the majority's
decision in Doran was synonymous with a blanket exception and failed to
consider the specific facts of the case. 166 Thus, the dissent argued that the
majority created a per se exception to the knock-and-announce principle for
methamphetamine labs, violating the notion that specific facts and circum-
stances are required to overcome the Fourth Amendment's right to privacy.
167
Lastly, the dissent discussed United States v. Lucht, a case Judge
Heaney called "indistinguishable" from the current case. 168 In Lucht, the
Eighth Circuit ruled that a large quantity of methamphetamine and a likeli-
hood of weapons was insufficient to justify a no-knock entry. 169 The dissent
also cited a portion of the Lucht opinion which reiterated the premise that "a
decision to force entry cannot rest on an assumption."'170 Judge Heaney noted
that, in Lucht, the executing officers' assumption of anti-police sentiments
was insufficient to warrant a forced entry. 171 The Lucht opinion reviewed the
criminal record of the occupant and determined that a drug possession con-
viction and a concealed weapons charge were insufficient to justify the as-
sumption. 172 The dissent compared the similarity of the alleged drug dealing
and weapons possession in both cases and noted that, under these circum-
160. Id. at 971.
161. Id. (citing Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 935-36 (1995)).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 971-72.
164. See supra notes 54-57.
165. Doran, 409 F.3d at 971 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 972.
167. Id. at 972-73 (citing Doran v. Eckold, 362 F.3d 1048, 1052 (8th Cir. 2004)).
168. Id. at 973.
169. United States v. Lucht, 18 F.3d 541, 550 (8th Cir. 1994).
170. Doran, 409 F.3d at 973 (quoting Lucht, 18 F.3d at 541).
171. Id. (citing Lucht, 18 F.3d at 541 (stating that anti-police sentiment was based
on the occupants' membership in a motorcycle gang)).
172. Id. (citing Lucht, 18 F.3d at 551).
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stances, the Lucht court held that a forced entry was unreasonable.' 73 Judge
Heaney recognized the ability of the en banc majority to overrule Lucht, but
questioned the majority's failure to mention this case. 174
In his conclusion, Judge Heaney reiterated the executing officers' unrea-
sonable reliance on mostly uncorroborated evidence.175 In addition, he argued
that cases involving drugs and weapons are not exempt from the knock-and-
announce principle without information specific to the particular case.' 76 The
dissent contended that the majority's decision did not conform to the Su-
preme Court's knock-and-announce principle. 177 As a result, the dissent ar-
gued that the decision left "an innocent man with no redress for clearly unrea-
sonable and unconstitutional government conduct."'
178
V. COMMENT
As discussed by the dissent, the majority's holding in Doran v. Eckold
failed to comply with the Supreme Court's knock-and-announce principle
and, in addition, created a deplorable standard for permissible police conduct.
First, the majority failed to meet the Supreme Court's standard by finding that
a no-knock entry was reasonable on insufficient evidence. Second, this deci-
sion created an extremely low threshold for officer due diligence to justify a
no-knock entry. This decision was not based upon adequate exigent circum-
stances to justify the officers' violation of Doran's Fourth Amendment right
to privacy in his own home.
The Supreme Court's knock-and-announce principle has long been a
fixture of Fourth Amendment reasonableness determinations.' 79 To disregard
this principle, the executing officers must offer proof of danger to officers or
possible destruction of evidence specific to each particular case.1 80 Traces of
methamphetamine, a bottle of Dristan and baggies from trash bags in front of
Doran's residence were the only particularized evidence against him. 81 As
Judge Heaney appropriately stated in the dissent, this evidence pointed only
to use or possible sale of methamphetamine.' 82 Such facts alone have previ-
ously been insufficient to justify a no-knock entry.183
173. Id.
174. Id.




179. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 929 (1995).
180. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1997).
181. Doran, 409 F.3d at 962.
182. Id. at 969.
183. See United States v. Lucht, 18 F.3d 541, 550 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Marts, 986 F.2d 1216, 1217-18 (8th Cir. 1993).
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Moreover, the majority's assertion that the trial court erred by attribut-
ing the investigating officer's inadequacies to the executing officers mischar-
acterizes the relevant issue. The issue was not whether the executing officers
could reasonably rely on the information provided by the investigating offi-
cers, as the majority seems to address.' 84 Instead, the issue was whether the
decision to use a no-knock entry was supported by the information received
from the investigating officer's inadequate investigation.
The majority seemed to argue that the executing officers' conduct was
constitutional because they reasonably relied on information provided by
other law enforcement personnel.1 85 This assertion misconstrued the general
principle that law enforcement personnel can rely on information provided by
other law enforcement personnel.1 86 In this case, the principle only provided
that the executing officers could rely on the investigator's conclusion that the
residue found in Doran's trash was actually methamphetamine and that the
uncorroborated tip was an uncorroborated tip. The majority, however, con-
fused this reliance with the validity of the uncorroborated tip itself.
As a result, the majority's brief discussion of this issue fails to address
the relevant question: whether the investigating officer's inadequate investi-
gation supported the no-knock entry. The majority should have considered
whether the executing officers' reliance on the uncorroborated tip was rea-
sonable, instead of whether they could rely on the information provided by
the investigating officer. The tip does not lose its status as being uncorrobo-
rated and anonymous simply because the investigating officer received and
conveyed it to the executing officers. The executing officer is not liable for an
inadequate investigation, but he should be liable for his unreasonable reliance
upon that investigation to justify the no-knock entry.
Due to this inadequate investigation, there was no specific information
establishing the existence of a methamphetamine lab or dangerous individuals
occupying the residence, situations which have previously justified a no-
knock entry. 187 Assumptions and anonymous tips do not satisfy the Supreme
Court's requirement for disposing with the knock-and-announce principle. 18
By permitting the no-knock entry in this case, the majority has created a
precedent similar to the per se exception the Supreme Court rejected in Rich-
ards v. Wisconsin.189 As previously discussed, the Supreme Court required a
case-by-case analysis of the facts to a particular entry. 19° In this case, the
Eighth Circuit has allowed mere suspicion of drug manufacturing and evi-
184. Doran, 409 F.3d at 965.
185. Id.
186. Id. (citing United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 232 (1985).
187. See United States v. Walsh, 299 F.3d 729 (8th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Keene, 915 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir. 1990).
188. See supra notes 47-85 and accompanying text.
189. See 520 U.S. 385 (1997).
190. Id. at 394.
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dence of use to justify a no-knock entry. The court offered no other particular
evidence to support the existence of exigent circumstances.
In addition to disregarding the Supreme Court's standard, the majority
has created an unacceptable precedent for police conduct. Under this prece-
dent, law enforcement officers need only circumstantial evidence of drug use
or sales and an assumption of methamphetamine production and hostile occu-
pants to justify a no-knock entry. By permitting an inadequate investigation to
justify the use of a no-knock entry, Doran promotes officers to perform their
duties inadequately. In Doran, an adequate investigation may have disclosed
information that would have dispelled the need for a no-knock entry. In the
future, officers may forego further investigation if the mere assumption of
risk is present and the no-knock entry is the preferable means of search war-
rant execution. The executing officer should, at a minimum, require the inves-
tigating officer to take all reasonable measures to validate the information
upon which she is basing her decision. Otherwise, anonymous tips and un-
substantiated evidence will continue to "justify" the violation of Fourth
Amendment rights.
The Eighth Circuit's failure to require more particularized evidence sub-
stantially lowers the threshold for justifying a no-knock entry. This decision
fails to adhere to the Supreme Court's standards and allows for inadequate
police conduct. As a result, this dilution of the knock-and-announce principle
substantially weakens the once inviolable Fourth Amendment right to privacy
in one's own home.
VI. CONCLUSION
The knock-and-announce rule was incorporated into the Fourth Amend-
ment to protect the privacy of persons in their own homes. 191 In addition, only
exigent circumstances, such as the risk of officer safety or disposal of evi-
dence, will eliminate the right to this privacy. 192 After the Eighth Circuit's
ruling in Doran v. Eckold, the threshold for proving such exigent circum-
stances has been reduced to an unacceptable level. This decision establishes
an illusory requirement which law enforcement officers can prove by a mere
assertion of risk. Moreover, this case presents a perfect example of why par-
ticular evidence of exigent circumstances is required to dispense with the
knock-and-announce rule. Without this requirement, more innocent people
will be left "with no redress for clearly unreasonable and unconstitutional
government conduct."' 193
MITCHELL E. KEMPKER
191. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995).
192. See Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997).
193. Doran v. Eckold, 409 F.3d 958, 974 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
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